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Is income inequality always bad for society? Francesc Trillas writes on the impact of inequality on
democracy. Taking issue with the perspectives of economists such as Gregory Mankiw, he argues
that a growing income gap between the wealthy and the rest of society can pose a fundamental
challenge for a country’s political system. He notes that the effects of globalisation, combined with
the flawed incentives contained within national politics, have reduced the ability of nation states to
tackle inequality. As a result only the development of new international institutions can solve the
problem.
When the Occupy Movement began using the slogan “We are the 99%”, many scholars thought that
the debate on rising income inequalities had been settled. They were wrong. The phrase made popular the work of
economists such as Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, who have presented evidence from tax records
suggesting that economic growth over the past few decades has disproportionately benefited only the wealthiest
segments of society.
Their evidence has also shown that economic mobility across generations has been lower than previously assumed.
Taken together, along with the fact that the economic and financial crisis has hit the most vulnerable sectors of
society in the periphery of Europe particularly hard, it seemed that conservative thinkers and commentators would
no longer be able to advance their arguments on the issue successfully. Recent books, such as Capital in the
Twenty-First Century by Thomas Piketty, The Haves and the Have-Nots by Branko Milanovic, and The Great
Escape by Angus Deaton, have outlined the dangers of income inequality for democracy. In so doing, they have lent
support to a number of articles suggesting that the “occupiers” were justified in mobilising around this issue. The
debate seemed largely closed.
Increasing income inequality in OECD countries could
be the result of factors such as globalisation,
technological advances, deregulation, ideology, capture
and institutional factors, such as reduced union
membership. While market income inequality has risen,
redistribution through tax/transfers has also become
less effective in many countries, probably because of
international capital mobility.
The spread of inequality, however, has not been
universal. In Latin America, income inequality has
slightly decreased over the last 30 years, according to
Gasparini and Lustig, but levels remain very high. The
wealthy continue to hold enormous influence over the
economy and the political process. In Chile, for
example, a country praised for its democratic
institutions, one of the country’s richest men has been
the president for the last four years, and the wealthiest
families control almost all newspapers, which have a
strong conservative ideological bias. The increase of democracy in the region has reduced inequality, but only
slightly. Many would have expected democracy to have had a much greater impact on inequality.
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Is income inequality always bad for society?
Despite growing concerns about income inequality, economist Gregory Mankiw has recently argued that inequalities
are an unavoidable or even beneficial aspect of economic progress, and therefore the rich must fight to keep them.
Robert Solow has replied to Mankiw, countering that the one per cent defend themselves well enough.
Mankiw’s core argument is that inequalities are necessary as incentives to encourage work and innovation, and that
inequality is not dangerous for democracy because wealthy people are divided in their support for conservative and
progressive causes. We should therefore go back to a “pre-Piketty” world, he suggests, where it is important to
focus on eradicating poverty, but inappropriate to concentrate on the issue of inequality.
While it is true that a fully egalitarian society in terms of outcomes would be detrimental for wealth creation, it is hard
to argue that the monetary incentives (for example in the financial industry) or returns on capital for the richest are
truly necessary for value creation. Even the typical argument that entrepreneurs deserve to be extremely rich must
be put into context, as many innovations (such as the Internet or the touch screen) were originally developed by
government, as pointed out by Mariana Mazzucato.
In any case, the largest fortunes in the world do not exist for meritocratic reasons. Top incomes mostly come from
executives in large companies, hedge funds, or from extremely wealthy heirs, as recently noted by Paul Krugman
on his blog and Piketty in his book.
Mankiw’s other argument is that high inequality is not a danger to democracy. The political power of the wealthy
should be considered neutral, since the wealthy support both conservative and progressive causes. However, the
fact that they support non-conservative leaders or political parties does not imply that they support progressive or
strongly egalitarian policies.
In fact, there are many instances of rich philanthropists focusing on poverty and child malnutrition, but not on income
inequality. They may actually support progressive parties or politicians not because they believe in progressive
causes, but in order to have influence over them and to pressure them not to adopt policies that might erode the
position of the very wealthy. Such attempts to control the political process may not be successful in their own right.
Nevertheless, as capital income continues to grow more than labour income (as explained by Piketty), it may lead to
an increased risk of plutocracy. The rich will have even more resources to control public life, while their fortunes may
escape national tax authorities (Piketty calculates world tax evasion at 10 per cent of global GDP).
Democracy might not be reducing inequality because it is not working well enough. In the future, elites may have
even more influence over the political process. They will promote causes that make them popular, but they will likely
never call into question the mechanisms that allowed them to amass enormous fortunes. This may lead to the
increasing privatisation of politics.
Measuring inequality
The data on inequality is always controversial. When Oxfam published a report stating that the 85 richest people in
the world had the same amount of wealth as the 3.5 billion poorest, the NGO’s methodology was called into
question, for example by Tim Harford in the Financial Times.
That is why it is essential that the best experts are involved in data gathering and reporting exercises. In this
respect, Piketty’s book constitutes one of the most impressive efforts. According to his figures, shown in the Table
below, there is a clear trend for the richest people in the world to see their incomes grow much more than those of
most other people.
Table: Average annual growth rate in the wealth/income of groups of the world’s population
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Source: Piketty (2013) Le Capital au XXIe siècle, p. 693
In the same period, the non-extreme poor in developing countries also increased their income, but Piketty’s figures
clearly show that the growth in the income of the very rich, coming from very high remunerations and returns on
capital, is in a league of their own.
In the first era of democracy, the institutions that built a more cohesive society – such as taxation, unions, education,
and public health – were national. With globalised markets, new institutions which perform the same functions must
be developed internationally. Nation states are no longer capable of fighting increasing inequalities. National politics
tend toward populism precisely because the state is largely powerless.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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